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Abstract
We present a decision theoretic framework in which agents are learning
about market behavior and that provides microfoundations for models
of adaptive learning. Agents are internally rational, i.e., maximize dis-
counted expected utility under uncertainty given consistent subjective
beliefs about the future, but agents may not be externally rational, i.e.,
may not know the true stochastic process for payo¤ relevant variables
beyond their control. This includes future market outcomes and funda-
mentals. We apply this approach to a simple asset pricing model and
show that the equilibrium stock price is then determined by investors
expectations of the price and dividend in the next period, rather than by
expectations of the discounted sum of dividends. As a result, learning
about price behavior a¤ects market outcomes, while learning about the
discounted sum of dividends is irrelevant for equilibrium prices. Stock
prices equal the discounted sum of dividends only after making very
strong assumptions about agentsmarket knowledge.
Keywords: learning, internal rationality, consumption based asset
pricing
JEL Class. No.: G12, G14, D83, D84
1 Motivation
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) places enormous demands
on agentsknowledge about how the market works. For most models it
implies that agents know exactly what market outcome will be associated
with any possible contingency that could arise in the future. This ap-
pears utterly unrealistic given that state contingent markets that could
provide agents with such detailed information often fail to exist.
The objective of this paper is to present a rigorous decision-theoretic
setup that allows to relax these strong informational assumptions about
how the market works and that is useful for modeling learning about
market behavior by agents. As we show, relaxing these informational
assumptions can have important implications for model behavior.
The basic idea is to separate the standard rationality requirements
embedded in the REH into an internal and an external rationality
component. Internal rationality requires that agents make fully optimal
decisions given a well dened system of subjective probability beliefs
about payo¤ relevant variables that are beyond their control or exter-
nal. External rationality postulates that agentssubjective probability
belief equals the objective probability density of external variables as
they emerge in equilibrium.
We propose to relax the external rationality assumption but to fully
maintain internal rationality. The result is a model with fully specied
microfoundations but limited knowledge about market behavior. This
reects the basic conviction that internal rationality is a good starting
point for analyzing social interactions; but as we show, external rational-
ity requires a huge amount of knowledge about the behavior of markets
and fundamentals in the future that not even expert economists possess.
We propose to consider small deviations from the external rational-
ity assumption that is embedded in the REH. Specically, we consider
agents who entertain subjective beliefs that are not exactly equal to the
objective density of external variables but that will be close to the beliefs
that an agent would entertain under the REH. This amounts to relaxing
the prior beliefsthat agents are assumed to entertain under the REH
and to study the economic implications of such a relaxation.
The literature on adaptive learning previously studied models in
which agents learn about how to forecast future market outcomes. This
literature, however, makes a number of ad-hoc assumptions about agents
behavior and learning mechanisms.1 As a result, the microfoundations
of adaptive learning models have not been carefully laid out, and it is
unclear to what extent agents in adaptive learning models take rational
1We discuss these in detail in section 2 below.
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decisions given the information they are assumed to possess. This gener-
ates controversy when such models are employed in empirical work or for
policy analysis, as is the case in an increasing number of contributions.2
To illustrate our approach we analyze a simple risk-neutral asset
pricing model with heterogeneous agents and standard forms of market
incompleteness. We choose this specic application for its simplicity and
because imperfect market knowledge gives rise to rather di¤erent pricing
equations within this setup. Heterogeneity across agents thereby insures
that there exists a distinction between the agents own decision problem,
which we assume to be perfectly known, and market behavior, which
we assume to be known only imperfectly. Market incompleteness helps
insuring existence of an optimal plan when agents hold diverse beliefs
in the presence of risk neutrality. It also implies that state contingent
markets do not provide agents with the missing information.
We nd - perhaps surprisingly - that the equilibrium stock price
is then determined by a one-step ahead asset pricing equation. More
precisely, the equilibrium stock price equals the marginal investors dis-
counted expected sum of the total stock payo¤ (price plus dividend) in
the next period. This di¤ers from models with perfect market knowl-
edge, where the equilibrium price equals the discounted sum of future
dividends. Our one-step ahead equilibrium pricing equation implies dif-
ferent market outcomes because the marginal agents expectations of
tomorrows price need not be related to the agents expectations about
future dividends. Indeed, it can be optimal for the agent to pay a high
price today - even if the agent expects the discounted sum of dividends
to be low - as long as the agent expects to be able to sell the stock at
a higher price tomorrow.3 The agent may reasonably expect to be able
to do so if she holds the expectation that the marginal agent tomorrow
will hold more optimistic price and dividend expectations.
This highlights that imperfect market knowledge amounts to a relax-
ation of the generally imposed common knowledge assumption. If the
investor does not know the preferences or dividend and price expecta-
tions of other agents, i.e., does not have perfect market knowledge, then
the investor can not infer a discounted sum formulation of the asset price
just from introspection and own beliefs about the dividend process. In-
2For example, Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2009), Adam (2005), Chakraborty
and Evans (2008), Cogley and Sargent (2008), Eusepi and Preston (2008), Marcet
and Nicolini (2003), and Timmermann (1993, 1996) use adaptive learning models
to explain data; Evans and Honkapohja (2003a, 2003b, 2005), Molnar and Santoro
(2007), Orphanides and Williams (2006) and Sargent (1999) employ such models for
policy analysis.
3This is so because it is optimal to engage in speculative trading in the sense of
Harrison and Kreps (1978).
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deed, we nd that internal rationality implies external rationality about
prices only in a few well-known - albeit highly restrictive - asset pricing
models. For example, when all agents are identical and this is com-
monly known, then equilibrium prices can be inferred from the agents
own decision problem.
With imperfect market knowledge, beliefs about future prices become
a crucial element for determining todays stock price. And since price
beliefs are not determined by agents dividend beliefs, this opens up
the possibility that learning about price behavior becomes an important
determinant of actual stock price behavior. Moreover, if agents hold the
view that prices are not equal to the discounted sum of dividends, then
actual prices will di¤er from the discounted sum of dividends, thereby
supporting their initial view.
An alternative way to understand why the stock price ceases to be a
discounted sum of dividends is to note that imperfect market knowledge
(or alternatively lack of common knowledge of agentspreferences and
beliefs) leads to a failure of the law of iterated expectations. Since the
identity of the marginal agent that actually prices the stock is changing
with time and because agents entertain heterogeneous beliefs, the equi-
librium price is given by expectations evaluated under di¤erent proba-
bility measures each period. As a result, one cannot iterate forward on
the one-step ahead pricing equation. This feature also emerged in Allen,
Morris and Shin (2006), who study an asset pricing model with imperfect
common knowledge. In their setting, the one-step ahead pricing equa-
tion emerges from the underlying two-period overlapping generations
framework and di¤erential information across generations is sustained
by introducing a noise trader assumption. Both features together im-
ply that one cannot easily iterate forward on the one-step ahead pricing
equations. While Allen, Morris and Shin maintain RE in a model with
private information, we depart from RE (by assuming imperfect market
knowledge) but derive the one-step ahead pricing equation in a setting
with innitely lived investors.
Besides determining the implications of imperfect market knowledge
for the equilibrium pricing equation, we demonstrate how ordinary least
squares learning - a widely assumed learning rule in the adaptive learning
literature - arises as the optimal way to update conditional expectations
from a complete and dynamically consistent set of probability beliefs.
The paper thereby provides Bayesian microfoundations for such adaptive
learning rules in a setting where agents fully dynamically optimize.4
Finally, we show how to specify agentsprobability beliefs so that they
4In contrast, the adaptive learning literature largely appealed to anticipated utility
maximization in the sense of Kreps (1998).
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involve only small deviations form the beliefs entertained under the REH.
We show that the microeconomic specication for internally ratio-
nal agents requires to set up the dynamic decision problem of agents
in a non-standard form. Specically, the probability space over which
agents condition their choices should include all payo¤-relevant external
variables, including prices. This departs from the standard formulation
in the literature where the probability space is reduced from the outset
to contain only exogenous (or fundamental) variables. This is possible
because in the standard formulation prices are assumed to be a func-
tion of exogenous fundamentals, and the equilibrium pricing functions
are assumed to be known to agents. For example, in the stock pricing
model the standard assumption is that dividends span the agentsprob-
ability space and that prices are a known function of dividends.5 This
standard procedure imposes a singularity in the joint density over stock
prices and dividends, with the singularity representing agentsknowledge
about the behavior of the market. Instead, we allow agents to entertain
a non-degenerate joint density over future prices and dividends. Even
though this is a potentially small departure from RE beliefs, we show
that the model outcome can be quite di¤erent.
A standard way to relax the strong informational assumptions under-
lying RE has been the concept of Bayesian rational expectations equi-
librium. Bayesian RE equilibria allow for imperfect information about
the density of exogenous variables (fundamentals) but maintain the as-
sumption of full knowledge of the mapping from dividends to prices and
thereby the singularity in the joint density over prices and dividends
described in the previous paragraph. Bayesian RE equilibria thus deal
with uncertainty about fundamentals (dividends) and market outcomes
(prices) in a rather asymmetric way.
In a well known paper Bray and Kreps (1987) argued that it is unclear
how much information agents need to possess about the market for a
Bayesian RE equilibrium to emerge.6 Our section 4 can be interpreted
as addressing this issue. We show that a series of strong assumptions
need to be satised for an optimizing agent to be able to map the process
for dividends into a single price outcome. These assumptions endow the
agent with a tremendous amount of additional knowledge about the
market, over and above what can be derived from internal rationality
alone. Roughly speaking, all agents need to possess the same information
as the theorist: they need to know all details about all other agents in
5This assumption is also made in the literature on rational bubbles, e.g., Santos
and Woodford (1997).
6This point has been discussed more recently, for example, by Marimon (1997)
and Sargent (2008).
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the economy, including other agentsprobability beliefs, discount factors
and so on, and all this needs to be common knowledge.
Assuming the existence of a singularity in agentsjoint beliefs about
prices and dividends, as is done in the RE literature, also appears to be
in stark contrast with what academic economists seem to know about the
relation between prices and the observed history of dividends in the real
world. This manifests itself in the fact that the empirical asset pricing
literature fails to agree on a dominant explanation of asset price behav-
ior, e.g., currently entertains habit models à la Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) and long-run risk models à la Bansal and Yaron (2004) as com-
peting explanations of asset price behavior. In contrast to this, agents in
most economic models in the RE literature have reached an agreement
on the correct model in period zero already. This existing uncertainty by
expert economists thus naturally suggests to endow agents in our models
with similar uncertainty about how prices are linked to fundamentals.
Finally, we show that even when a Bayesian REE emerges, the asset
pricing predictions prove extremely sensitive to ne details in agents
beliefs about the dividend process. Based on this we conclude that
agentsprior beliefs matter much more than other economic factors for
the behavior of equilibrium stock prices in a Bayesian RE equilibrium.
The pricing implications in Bayesian RE equilibrium models thus appear
more arbitrary than previously recognized.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a list
of unresolved issues in the adaptive learning literature. In section 3 we
introduce a simple stock pricing model with incomplete markets and het-
erogeneous agents, we show how to introduce internal rationality, derive
investors optimality conditions, and dene a competitive equilibrium
with internally rational agents. Section 4 compares our equilibrium con-
cept to Bayesian RE equilibrium and shows how agentsmarket knowl-
edge needs to be strengthened enormously in order for a discounted sum
of dividends and the Bayesian RE equilibrium to arise. Section 5 shows
a consistent set of beliefs where agents are uncertain about the mapping
from dividends to prices. We show how to entertain small deviations
from RE beliefs and how least-squares learning equations then emerge
from an optimal use of information. Section 6 presents a formal result
about the strong sensitivity of the discounted sum of dividends to prior
information about the dividend process. Section 7 discusses some of the
related literature. A conclusion summarizes.
2 Adaptive Learning Literature: Open Issues
The adaptive learning literature relaxes agentsknowledge about the be-
havior of market determined variables but also makes a number of ad-hoc
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assumptions on agentsbehavior and learning mechanisms. These give
rise to important questions regarding the microfoundations of adaptive
learning models.
The source of the problem is as follows: the adaptive learning liter-
ature takes as point of departure the rst order optimality conditions
that emerge under the REH; it then replaces the rational expectations
operator E appearing in these optimality conditions by an operator of
perceived expectations eE; it then assumes that agents constantly re-
estimate the parameters involved in these perceived expectations in the
light of new data using some stochastic approximation algorithm.
This procedure can be implemented in several ways, so that one
can reach the conclusion that the results depend on arbitrary modeling
choices. One element of arbitrariness arises because rst order conditions
under the REH can be written in many equivalent ways, so that one
can replace rational expectations by the subjective operator eE in many
di¤erent ways. This can lead to rather di¤erent outcomes.
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2009), for example, use a one-step-ahead
asset pricing equation Pt =  eEt(Pt+1 + Dt+1) and show that a number
of empirical stock price puzzles can be explained if agents are learning
about future price behavior. By contrast Timmermann (1996) and oth-
ers set the stock price equal to expected discounted sum of dividends, i.e.,
uses Pt = eEtP1j=1 jDt+j, and studies learning about discounted divi-
dends, nding a much more muted impact on stock prices from learn-
ing behavior. Which is the rightway to set up the learning model?
Likewise, Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) have formulated DSGE mod-
els under learning using one-step-ahead Euler equations while Preston
(2005) showed that learning outcomes in a monetary model di¤er when
using the budget constraint to obtain a discounted sum formulation of
the optimality conditions. Again, which is the rightway to set up the
learning model?
Another element of arbitrariness emerges because a large number of
stochastic approximation algorithms are available to formulate estimates
of the parameters that determine agentsperceptions eE: The literature
has used a range of stochastic approximation algorithms, e.g., ordinary
least squares learning, constant gain learning, or switching gain algo-
rithms. Which is the rightway to model the response of perceptions
to new data?
Finally, while the perceptions eE are constantly evolving over time,
agents behave as if their current view will remain unchanged in the fu-
ture, following the anticipated utility concept of Kreps (1998). It is
unclear whether this way of decision making will lead to an admissible
plan in the Bayesian sense, i.e., whether there exists at all a dynami-
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cally consistent subjective probability measure under which the agents
decisions resulting from this procedure are optimal.
Under the framework of this paper modeling choices are determined
from rational behavior of agents and the microeconomic specications
of the agents decision problem. Surprisingly, it will turn out that some
of the short-cuts of the adaptive learning literature are less ad-hoc than
might initially appear.
3 Internal Rationality with Imperfect Market Knowl-
edge
This section introduces the concept of internal rationality, shows how
to dene agents probability space and denes and characterizes the
competitive equilibrium with internal rationality.
To illustrate our approach we study a risk-neutral asset pricing model
with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. We choose such a
model for its simplicity and because we obtain very di¤erent pricing
implications from the standard case with perfect market knowledge.
Agents in our model di¤er in their discount factor and in their sub-
jective beliefs. Markets are incomplete because of the existence of con-
straints that limit the amount of stocks investors can buy or sell and
because contingent claim markets are unavailable. The presence of in-
vestor heterogeneity and market incompleteness allows us to distinguish
between investorsknowledge of their own decision problem and their
knowledge about market-determined variables, i.e., future asset prices,
which are also inuenced by the discount factors and beliefs of other
(possibly di¤erent) investors.
3.1 Basic Asset Pricing Model
The economy has t = 0; 1; 2; ::: periods and is populated by I innitely-
lived risk-neutral investor types. There is a unit mass of investors of
each type, all of them initially endowed with 1=I units of an innitely
lived stock. Agents of type i 2 f1; :::; Ig have a standard time-separable
utility function
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
 
i
t
Cit (1)
where Cit denotes consumption at t and 
i a type-specic discount factor.
The operator EP
i
0 denotes the agents expectations in some probability
space (
;S,P i), where 
 is the space of realizations, S the corresponding
-Algebra, and P i a subjective probability measure over (
;S). As
usual, the probability measure P i is a model primitive and given to
agents. It is allowed to be type-specic and, due to imperfect market
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knowledge, it may or may not coincide with objective probabilities. The
stocks Sit owned by agents represent claims to an innitely lived tree that
yields each period Dt units of a perishable consumption good which are
paid as dividend.
The non-standard part in our formulation is in the underlying prob-
ability space. We consider agents who view the process for fPt; Dtg as
external to their decision problem and the probability space over which
they condition their choices is given by

  
P  
D
where 
X =
1Y
t=0
R+ with X 2 fP;Dg. The probability space thus
contains all possible sequences of prices and dividends. Letting S denote
the sigma-algebra of all Borel subsets of 
; we assume that type is beliefs
are given by a well dened probability measure P i over (
;S). As usual
we denote the set of all possible dividend histories up to period t by 
tD
and we let Dt 2 
tD denote a typical dividend history. Using similar
denitions for prices, the set of all histories up to period t is given by

t = 
tP  
tD and its typical element is denoted by !t 2 
t:
With this setup rational investors will condition their decisions on
the history of observed dividend and price realizations. This is a natural
setup in a model of competitive behavior: since investors see prices as a
stochastic variable that is beyond their control and since prices inuence
their budget constraint, investors want to condition their choices on the
realization of prices, in addition to the realization of dividends.
Note that we have endowed agents with a dynamically consistent
set of subjective beliefs, i.e., (
;S;P i) is a proper probability space,
P i satises all the standard probability axioms and gives proper joint
probabilities to all possible values of prices and dividends in any set of
dates. Moreover, although there is a time-invariant probability measure
P i, our setup is general enough to allow for agents that are learning
about the stochastic processes of prices and dividends. For example,
P i could arise from a view that agents entertain about the stochastic
processes describing the evolution of prices and dividends and by some
prior beliefs about unknown parameters of these processes. A particular
example of this kind of subjective beliefs will be given in section 5.1.
Investors of type i choose consumption and stock holdings (Cit ; S
i
t)
contingent on the observed history !t = (P t; Dt), i.e., they choose 
Cit ; S
i
t

: 
t ! R2 (2)
for all t: The expected utility (1) associated with any such contingent
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consumption choice can then be written as
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
 
i
t
Cit =
Z


1X
t=0
 
i
t
Cit(!
t) dP i(!): (3)
The stock can be purchased and sold costlessly in a perfectly competitive
spot market at ex-dividend price Pt. Agent i thereby faces the following
ow budget constraint
Cit + Pt S
i
t  (Pt +Dt)Sit 1 +  (4)
which has to hold for all t and all !t 2 
t: Here  denotes a su¢ ciently
large endowment of consumption goods, which is introduced for simplic-
ity: it allows us to ignore non-negativity constraints on consumption.7
Besides the budget constraint, consumers face the following limit
constraints on stock holdings:
Sit  0 (5)
Sit  S (6)
where 1 < S <1. Constraint (5) is a standard short-selling constraint
and often used in the literature. The second constraint (6) is a simplied
form of a leverage constraint capturing the fact that the consumer cannot
buy arbitrarily large amounts of stocks. Constraint (6) helps to insure
existence of a maximum in the presence of risk neutral investors.
We are now in a position to dene internal rationality within the
current setting:
Denition 1 (Internal Rationality) Agent i is internally rational if
she chooses the functions (2) to maximize expected utility (3) subject to
the budget constraint (4), and the limit constraints (5) and (6), taking
as given the probability measure P i.
For more general settings, internal rationality requires that agents
maximize their objective function taking into account all relevant con-
straints, that they condition their actions on the history of all observable
external variables, and that they evaluate the probability of future exter-
nal outcomes using a consistent set of subjective beliefs, which is given
to them from the outset.
Within the context of the present model we assume that P i satises
EP
i
[Pt+1 +Dt+1j!t] <1 for all !; t; i (7)
7No substantial result depends on the fact that the non-negativity constraint on
consumption is not binding.
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and that a maximum of the investors utility maximization problem ex-
ists.8
3.2 Optimality Conditions
Under internal rationality the space of outcomes 
 considered by agents
includes all external variables, i.e., the histories of prices and the history
of dividends. Agents can thus assign a consistent set of probabilities
to all payo¤ relevant external events. Consequently, the rst order op-
timality conditions are found in a standard way. In particular, one of
the following conditions has to hold for all periods t and for almost all
realizations in !t 2 
t :
Pt < 
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) and S
i
t = S (8a)
Pt = 
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) and S
i
t 2

0; S

(8b)
Pt > 
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) and S
i
t = 0 (8c)
where EP
i
t denotes the expectation conditional on !
t computed with the
measure P i. Since the objective function is concave and the feasible set
is convex these equations determine necessary conditions for the agents
optimal investment decisions.
Importantly, the optimality conditions are of the one-step-ahead form,
i.e., they involve todays price and the expected price and dividend to-
morrow. Therefore, to take optimal decisions the agent only needs to
know whether the observed realization !t implies that the expected stock
return is higher, equal or lower than the inverse of the own discount fac-
tor. Since agents can trade stocks in any period without transaction
costs, the one-step-ahead optimality conditions (8) deliver optimal in-
vestment choices, even if stocks can be held for an arbitrary number of
periods.
Just to emphasize, it is not true that an internally rational agent
has to compare todays price with the discounted sum of dividends in
order to act optimally! Intuitively, our agents simply try to buy low
and sell highas much as the stock holding constraints allow them to do.
This is the optimal strategy because it is optimal for agents to engage
in speculative behavior in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978).
We show below that with imperfect market knowledge, an agents
expectations of the future price is not determined by the agents dividend
expectations and internal rationality. The rst order conditions above,
8Appendix A.1 shows that the existence of a maximum can be guaranteed by
bounding the utility function. For notational simplicity we treat the case with linear
utility in the main text and assume existence of a maximum.
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therefore, turn out to be equivalent to a discounted sum of dividend
formulation only in very special cases.
3.3 Standard Belief Formulation: A Singularity
The setup for beliefs dened in the previous section di¤ers from standard
dynamic economic modeling practice, which imposes additional restric-
tions on beliefs. Specically, the standard belief specication assumes
that agents formulate probability beliefs only over the reduced state
space 
D and that agents choices are contingent on the history of div-
idends only. Agents are then endowed with the knowledge that each
realization Dt 2 
tD is associated with a given level of the stock price
Pt, which amounts to endowing agents with knowledge of a function
Pt : 

t
D ! R+ (9)
that maps dividend realization into equilibrium prices. The probabili-
ties for the price process are then constructed from knowledge of this
function and beliefs over 
D: Clearly, knowledge of the function (9)
represents knowledge regarding market outcomes: agents know exactly
which market outcome is going to be associated with a particular history
of fundamentals. As a consequence, observed prices carry only redun-
dant information, so that there is no need to condition choices on the
history of prices.
This standard belief specication can thus be interpreted as a special
case of the formulation outlined in the previous section, namely one
where P i is assumed to impose a degeneracy between pairs (P t; Dt).
In contrast, our more general belief formulation outlined in section 3.1
allows agents to be uncertain about the relation between prices and
dividends.
The standard formulation using degenerate beliefs is consistent with
the rational expectations equilibrium outcome, so no loss of generality
is implied by imposing the singularity in P i from the outset under the
REH. But as we will show in sections 3.5 and 4 below, knowledge of
this singularity is not a consequence of agentsability to maximize their
utility or to behave rationally given their subjective beliefs. Instead, it
is the result of a set of strong assumptions that imply that agents know
from the outset how the market works. Indeed, agents know the market
so well that they are able to map each potential future dividend sequence
into a single value for the stock price. Given that such a relationship
between dividends and prices remains fairly elusive to academic econo-
mists - these still entertain a range of alternative asset pricing models
each of which implies a di¤erent function Pt - it seems equally reasonable
to consider agents who are also not fully certain about the map linking
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dividends to prices. Imperfect knowledge about market behavior is thus
naturally modeled by allowing agents to entertain beliefs about the joint
process for prices and dividends that does not impose a singularity.
3.4 Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(IREE)
This section considers the process for competitive equilibrium prices with
internally rational agents and denes an Internally Rational Expecta-
tions Equilibrium (IREE). We show that agentsbeliefs about dividends
- even when combined with knowledge of the equilibrium asset pricing
equation - do not impose restrictions on agentsprice beliefs. Internal
rationality alone thus fails to imply that agents know the mapping (9)
from dividends to prices.
We rst propose a competitive equilibrium denition that is as close
as possible to the standard formulation. The denition below is specic
to our stock pricing model but is easily extended to more general se-
tups. Let (
D;SD;PD) be a probability space over the space of histories
of dividends 
D and PD denoting the objectiveprobability measure
for dividends. Also, let !D 2 
D denote a typical innite history of
dividends.
Denition 2 (IREE) An Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(IREE) consists of a sequence of equilibrium price functions fPtg1t=0
where Pt : 
tD ! R+, contingent choices fCit ; Sitg1t=0 of the form (2) and
probability beliefs P i for each agent i, such that
(1) all agents i = 1; :::; I are internally rational, and
(2) when agents evaluate fCit ; Sitg at equilibrium prices, markets clear
for all t and all !D 2 
D almost surely in PD.
An IREE is a competitive equilibrium allowing for the possibility that
agentssubjective density about future prices and dividends is not neces-
sarily equal to the objective density. Or equivalently, it is an equilibrium
in which agents are internally rational but not necessarily externally ra-
tional.
The previous literature has studied Arrow-Debreu (AD) models in
which agentssubjective probability densities about fundamentals may
not coincide with the actual densities of the fundamentals.9 It is impor-
tant to note that an IREE is not a special case of the AD setting. This is
the case because the AD framework embodies two basic features: i) any
physical goods is treated as a di¤erent good if delivered in a di¤erent
9See Blume and Easley (2006) for a recent application.
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period or for a di¤erent realization of the fundamentals; ii) agents ob-
serve all equilibrium prices for all goods. These features together imply
that a price function of the form (9) is embodied in agentsbeliefs, while
such a singularity is absent in our setup. And as we argue in the next
section, it is natural to consider beliefs without such a singularity.
We now determine the equilibrium price mappings Pt. Equilibrium
prices will depend on standard fundamentals, e.g., agentsutility func-
tions, discount factors, and dividend beliefs, but also on agentsprice
beliefs, as summarized by the probability measures P i. Moreover, since
agents do not necessarily hold rational price expectations, we need to
distinguish between the stochastic process for equilibrium prices Pt and
agentsperceived price process Pt. The rst order conditions (8) imply
that the asset is held by the agent type with the most optimistic beliefs
about the discounted expected price and dividend in the next period.10
Equilibrium prices thus satisfy:
Pt = max
i2I
h
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)
i
(10)
Since the expectations EP
i
t are conditional on the realization Pt, the
equilibrium price a¤ects both sides of the expression above. At this
level of generality it is therefore unclear whether there always exists
an equilibrium price for any given dividend history Dt or whether it is
unique. At this point, we proceed by simply assuming existence and
uniqueness.
3.5 Should Internally Rational Agents Impose a Sin-
gularity in Beliefs?
The equilibrium price function Pt : 
tD ! R+ emerging in an IREE is
indeed a function of the history of dividends only. Using this observation
one might conclude that rational agents should indeed hold degenerate
beliefs for the joint density over prices and dividends. The problem
with this argument is, however, that knowledge of the existence of a
degeneracy does not inform agents about its exact location. And as we
show below, agents cannot derive the equilibrium degeneracy just from
knowledge of their own utility functions and their own dividend beliefs.
This holds true even if the equilibrium asset pricing equation (10) is
known to agents and common knowledge.
This suggests a natural interpretation for why agentsbeliefs might
not contain a singularity: agents are simply uncertain about the location
10This emerges because we assume S > 1 so that the constraint (6) never binds in
equilibrium. Extensions to the case with S < 1 are straightfoward.
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of the singularity, i.e., they are uncertain about the correct model linking
stock prices to the history of dividends.
We now show that the singularity is not easily located. Let mt :

tD ! f1; : : : ; Ig denote the marginal agent pricing the asset in period
t in equilibrium:11
mt = argmax
i2I
h
i EP
i
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)
i
(11)
Clearly the equilibrium price (10) can thus be written as
Pt = 
mt EP
m t
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) (12)
We now suppose that agents know that the equilibrium price satises
equation (12) each period and that this is common knowledge.12 Do-
ing so endows agents with a considerable amount of information about
how the market prices the asset. Specically, common knowledge im-
plies that each agent knows that other agents know that the asset is
priced according to (12) each period, that each agents knows that other
agents know that others know it to be true, and so on to innity.13 We
can express this formally by saying that from the agentsviewpoint the
following equation holds
Pt = 
mt EP
m t
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1) (13)
and that each agent has price beliefs P i that are consistent with this
equation. The question we are posing is: would common knowledge of
equation (13) allow internally rational agents to impose restrictions on
price beliefs as a function of their beliefs about dividends? Would it
allow agents to determine a singularity?
Common knowledge of equation (13) allows agents to iterate forward
on this equation, say T times, to nd
Pt = 
mt EP
m t
t (Dt+1)
+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1 Dt+2

(14)
+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1

mt+2EP
m t+2
t+2 Dt+3

+ :::
+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1

: : : mt+TEP
m t+T
t+T (Pt+T+1 +Dt+T+1)

11If the argmax is non-unique we can use a selection criterion from among all
marginal agents. For example, we can take mt to be the marginal agent with the
lowest index i.
12Internally rational agents do not need to have such knowledge to behave optimally
conditional on their beliefs.
13See Aumann (1976) for a formal denition.
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The last three lines of the right-hand side of this equation provide an al-
ternative expression for agentsdiscounted expectations of next periods
price. They show that knowledge of (13) implies that agentsprice ex-
pectations are given by their beliefs about which agents are going to
be marginal in the future and by their beliefs about what beliefs future
marginal agents will hold about future dividends and the terminal price.
Since agent i is not marginal in all periods and since agent i can ra-
tionally believe other agents to hold rather di¤erent beliefs, own beliefs
about dividends fail to restrict the beliefs agent i can entertain about
prices. For example, agent i can believe the future discounted sum of
dividends to be low but at the same time believe the future price to be
high - all that is required is that the agent believes future marginal agents
to be relatively more optimistic about future dividends and prices. This
shows that own dividend beliefs, knowledge of (13), and internal ratio-
nality fail to imply a specic singularity in agentsprobability measure
P i over prices and dividends.
In the literature, the discounted sum of dividends is usually obtained
by applying the law of iterated expectations on the right side of equation
(14). This can be done whenever all conditional expectations are with
respect to the same probability measure, e.g., if mt is constant through
time. In our model mt is random whenever P i assigns positive probabil-
ity to the event that the agent may not be marginal at some point in the
future. If in addition the agent believes that other agents hold di¤erent
(price and dividend) beliefs, then the law of iterated expectations can
not be applied to (14). Price expectations then fail to be determined
by agents expectations of the discounted sum of dividends. Determining
the location of the singularity is thus far from obvious. The next section
explores this issue further
4 Bayesian Rational Expectations Equilibrium
This section determines what additional market information investors
need to possess to be able to impose the correctsingularity in their sub-
jective beliefs P i over prices and dividends, i.e., the singularity that ac-
tually emerges in equilibrium. Specically, we show that agents need to
possess a tremendous amount of information about the market to be able
to derive the correct equilibrium pricing function Pt. Our results thus
conrm conjectures expressed previously by Bray and Kreps (1987) re-
garding the strong informational requirements underlying Bayesian REE
models.
When agentsprice beliefs coincide with the equilibrium outcome,
then Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium reduces to a Bayesian
Rational Expectations Equilibrium (Bayesian REE), formally:
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Denition 3 (Bayesian REE) A Bayesian Rational Expectations Equi-
librium is an Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium in which agents
subjective beliefs P i are consistent with the equilibrium price function Pt,
i.e.
ProbP
i
(Pt = Pt j Dt) = 1
for all t; !; i:
The term Bayesian in this denition is justied because agents
knowledge of the dividend process may be imperfect. For example,
agents may be uncertain about some of the parameters in the law of
motion of dividends. When all agents know the dividend process, then
the Bayesian REE simplies further to a standard REE.
We now provide su¢ cient conditions on P i so that the IREE reduces
to a Bayesian REE. As in the previous section, we start by endowing
agents with knowledge of how the market prices the asset for all periods
t and all states !:
Assumption 1 It is common knowledge that equation (13) holds for
all t and all ! 2 
.
This allows agents to iterate on the equilibrium asset price equation
(13) to obtain equation (14). Importantly, agents can not iterate on
their own rst order optimality conditions because these do not always
hold with equality.
The discounted sum expression (14) still contains expectations about
the terminal price Pt+T . To eliminate price expectations altogether, one
thus needs to impose that all agents know that the equilibrium asset
price satises a no-rational-bubblerequirement:
Assumption 2 It is common knowledge that
lim
T!1
mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1

: : : mt+TEP
m t+T
t+T (Pt+T )

= 0
for all t and all !D 2 
D.
Assumption 2 again provides information about the market: all agents
know that marginal agents expect future marginal agents to expect (and
so on to innity) that prices grow at a rate less than the correspond-
ing discount factors. In the case with homogeneous expectations and
discount factors this requirement reduces to the familiar condition
lim
T!1
EPt
 
T Pt+T

= 0 (15)
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As in the general case with heterogeneous expectations, this more famil-
iar no-rational-bubblecondition endows agents with knowledge of how
the market prices the asset asymptotically.
Assumption 2 allows to take the limit T ! 1 in equation (13) and
to abstract from expectations about the terminal selling price:
Pt = 
mt EP
m t
t (Dt+1)
+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1 Dt+1

+ mt EP
m t
t

mt+1EP
m t+1
t+1

mt+2EP
m t+2
t+2 Dt+2

+ ::: (16)
One thus obtains an expression for the asset price in terms of the ex-
pected discounted sum of marginal agentsexpectations of future mar-
ginal agents dividend expectations, and so on. Agents may, however,
still entertain a range of views about who will be marginal in the future
and what the dividend expectations of such marginal agents are going
to be. Therefore, agents might still not associate a single equilibrium
price to each Dt 2 
D.
For equation (16) to impose a singularity, agents have to believe
in a given mapping mt : 
tD ! f1; : : : ; Ig and they must know the
discount factor i and the probability measure P i for all other agents
i: An agent can then use equation (16) and the own beliefs about the
dividend process to evaluate the right side of (16), i.e., can associate a
single price outcome with any dividend history Dt.
Furthermore, in a Bayesian REE the resulting price beliefs must be
objectively true given the dividend history. This fails to be the case if
agents employ an arbitrary mapping mt. Therefore, agents must employ
the mapping mt that is objectively true in equilibrium! Letting mt :

tD ! f1; 2; : : : ; Ig denote this equilibrium mapping, we need
Assumption 3 The equilibrium functionsmt all t, the discount factors
i and the probability measures P i for all i are known to all agents.
Clearly, Assumption 3 incorporates a tremendous amount of knowl-
edge about the market: agents need to know for each possible dividend
history which agent is marginal, what is the marginal agents discount
factor, and the marginal agents belief system. Only then can agents im-
pose the correct singularity (16) on their joint beliefs about the behavior
of prices and dividends.
The simplest and most common way in the literature to impose As-
sumptions 1-3 is to consider the leading asset pricing example, i.e., a
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representative agent model with sequentially complete markets and price
beliefs that satisfy the no rational bubble requirement (15). If the repre-
sentative agent knows that she is marginal at all times and contingencies,
her rst order condition holds with equality at all periods. She can then
iterate on it and evaluate future expectations by applying the law of
iterated expectations to own beliefs. In this specic case, internal ratio-
nality (plus assumption 2) then implies equality between the equilibrium
asset price and the discounted sum of dividends. The leading asset price
example may thus erroneously suggest that the equality between the
market clearing asset price and the expected discounted sum of divi-
dends is the result of (internally) rational investment behavior on the
side of agents, but - as we have just shown - this fails to be true once
slightly more general settings with heterogeneous agents and incomplete
markets are considered.
This raises the important question of how agents could have possibly
acquired the detailed knowledge about the working of the market that
they are assumed to possess under the REH? Given that the equilibrium
price does not even come close to revealing the underlying process for
market fundamentals (mt, 
i and P i), it is hard to see how an agent
could possibly be certain from the outset about how these fundamentals
relate to the dividend process.
5 Asset Pricing with Imperfect Market Knowledge
This section presents a specic example showing how one can slightly
relax the strong market knowledge assumptions underlying a Bayesian
REE. The example is of interest because it shows - perhaps surprisingly
- that for some models the standard approach taken in the adaptive
learning literature, as discussed in section 2, can be consistent with in-
ternal rationality. Specically, we show that the asset pricing model in
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2009), which uses a one-step-ahead pricing
equation and replaces the expectations operator in this equation by a
least squares learning algorithm, can be derived from a model with in-
ternally rational agents whose prior beliefs are close to the RE beliefs.
This is important because the learning model explored in Adam, Marcet
and Nicolini gives rise to equilibrium prices dynamics that quantitatively
replicates a wide range of asset prizing facts within a very simple setup.
The model below abstracts from heterogeneity amongst agents and
considers instead a model with homogenous agents. Heterogeneity was
useful in the previous section to highlight that in realistic models a huge
amount of market knowledge is required for agents to deduce market
outcomes and for a Bayesian REE to arise, but heterogeneity is not
crucial for the characterization in this section. All we require is that
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homogeneity amongst agents fails to be common knowledge, so that
agents cannot deduce the market outcome from what they know.14
We start by determining the REE, then show how one can relax
slightly the singularity in prior beliefs that agents are assumed to enter-
tain in the REE. Finally, we show how Bayesian learning about the price
process gives rise to the ordinary least squares (OLS) learning equations
assumed in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2009).
5.1 Perfect Knowledge Benchmark (REE)
We consider risk neutral agents who share the same beliefs and the same
discount factor . Following the standard approach in the asset pricing
literature we assume that the true process for dividends is given by
logDt=Dt 1 = log a+ log "t (17)
with a > 0, log "t  iiN (0; 2) and D 1 > 0 given. Log dividends
thus grow at the rate log a on average and dividend growth innovations
are unpredictable. When the dividend process (17) and homogeneity of
agents is common knowledge, i.e., if agents know all relevant features
of other agents in the market, then internal rationality implies that the
market equilibrium is given by the REE outcome, i.e.,
PREt =
 a e
2=2
1   a e2=2Dt
The equilibrium price process thus evolves according to
logPREt =P
RE
t 1 = log a+ log "t (18)
so that prices grow at the same rate as dividends. The stochastic inno-
vation in the price growth process is thereby the same as in the dividend
growth process, illustrating the existence of a singularity in the joint
evolution of prices and dividends. While it is well known that these
aspects of the REE solution are empirically unappealing, our discussion
in section 3 about market knowledge suggests that they may be equally
unappealing on theoretical grounds. The next section relaxes agents
knowledge about the stochastic processes (17) and (18).
5.2 Imperfect Knowledge: Relaxing REE Priors
We now relax the assumption that homogeneity of agents is common
knowledge, so that agents have imperfect knowledge about other agents
14Alternatively, the homogeneous agent model below could be interpreted as an
approximation to the solution of a heterogeneous agent model in which the degree
of heterogeneity is vanishing but where vanishing heterogeneity fails to be common
knowledge.
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preferences and beliefs. This allows us to consider internally rational
agents that hold subjective beliefs P that are slightly di¤erent from the
ones that they are assumed to entertain in the REE. Specically, we
assume that agents believe prices and dividends to evolve according to
the following process
logPt=Pt 1
logDt=Dt 1

=

log P
log D

+

log "Pt
log "Dt

(19)
for given (P 1; D 1) and with
(log "Pt ; log "
D
t )
0  iiN(0;)
 =

2P PD
PD 
2
D

This specication allows for di¤erent growth rates of prices and dividends
and for innovations to prices and dividends that are only imperfectly
correlated. Unlike before, we now consider agents who are uncertain
about the mean growth rates of prices
 
log P

and dividends (log D)
and about the covariance matrix of innovations (). We capture agents
uncertainty at time zero by prior beliefs about these unknown parameters
and summarize these by a probability density function
(log P ; log D;)  f
The prior beliefs f together with the laws of motion (19) fully deter-
mine agentsprobability measure P over innite sequences of price and
dividends realizations.15
The previous system of beliefs gives rise to the beliefs that agents
entertain in the REE in the special case when agentsprior assigns prob-
ability one to the outcome
P = D = a ,  = 2

1 1
1 1

We call this the RE priorand let PRE denote the associated probability
measure over sequences of prices and dividends. The singularity in this
measure shows up in the form of a singular covariance matrix .
We now relax these RE priors slightly. The relaxation gives rise to
an alternative probability measure P without a singularity in the joint
15Given this structure, the probabilities assigned by P can be obtained as follows:
for any Borel subset s  S, determine the likelihood of prices and dividends being
in s for any given value of (log P ; log D;) using standard methods for Markov
processes applied to equation (19). Then integrate these probabilities over values of
(log P ; log D;) according to f .
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density over prices and dividends. We will say that the measure P
involves a small deviation from REE beliefs if for any given subset of

t, the probability assigned to this subset by P is arbitrarily close to
the probability assigned by PRE.
In the interest of obtaining closed form solutions for the evolution
of the posterior beliefs, we use a conjugate prior specication for f that
is of the Normal-Wishart form. Specically, we consider prior beliefs of
the form
H  W (S0; n0) (20a) 
log P ; log D
0H = h  N  log P0 ; log D0 0 ; (0h) 1 (20b)
for given parameters log P0 ; log 
D
0 ; 0; S0 and n0. The Wishart distrib-
ution W with precision matrix S 10 and n0 > 1 degrees of freedom spec-
ies agentsmarginal prior about the inverse of the variance covariance
matrix of innovations H   1, where n0 scales the precision of prior
beliefs. The normal distribution N species agents priors about the
parameters
 
log P ; log D

conditional on the precision matrix H being
equal to h, where
 
log P0 ; log 
D
0

denotes the conditional prior mean
and 0 > 0 scales the precision of prior beliefs about
 
log P ; log D

.
The RE prior arises in the Normal-Wishart prior for 
P0 ; 
D
0

= (a; a) (21)
S0 = 
2

1 1  
1   1

(22)
and when considering the limiting case with vanishing prior uncertainty
n0!1
0!1
and perfectly correlated innovations
! 0
Therefore, for large (n0; 0) and small  and for initial values given by
equations (21) and (22), the beliefs P of agents involve only small de-
viation from REE beliefs. The next section determines the equilibrium
asset prices implied by these beliefs P.
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5.3 Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium
When all agentsbeliefs are given by P, it follows from equations (13)
and (19) that the equilibrium asset price is given by
Pt = E
P
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)
= EPt

elog 
P
elog "
P
t+1

Pt + E
P
t

elog 
D
elog "
D
t+1

Dt (23)
The equilibrium price thus depends on agentsconditional time t expec-
tations of elog 
X
elog "
X
t+1 (for X 2 fP;Dg). The next section determines
the evolution of these conditional expectations over time and shows that
they can be described by ordinary least squares (OLS) learning rules.
5.4 Bayesian Updating and OLS Learning
We start by determining the posterior beliefs for log P ; log D and .
We thereby use the fact that our prior specication (20) is conjugate,
so that the posterior in period t is again of the Normal-Wishart form
(20).16 The posterior is given by
H j !t W (St; nt) (24a) 
log P ; log D
0H = h; !t N  log Pt ; log Dt 0 ; (th) 1 (24b)
where the parameters
 
log Pt ; log 
D
t ; t; St; nt

evolve recursively as fol-
lows: 
log Pt+1
log Dt+1

=

log Pt
log Dt

+
1
t + 1
et (25a)
t+1 = t + 1 (25b)
S 1t+1 = S
 1
t +
t
t + 1
ete
0
t (25c)
nt+1 = nt + 1 (25d)
with et denoting the one-step-ahead forecast error:
et =
 
log Pt
Pt 1
  log Pt
log Dt
Dt 1
  log Dt
!
Letting denote an approximation that is correct up to rst order,
appendix A.2 shows that the posterior beliefs imply that the conditional
16The subsequent result follows from Theorem 1, chapter 9.10 in DeGroot (1970).
Our variables can be mapped into the ones employed in DeGroots theorem using:
h! r, H ! R, nt ! , S 1t !  ,

log Pt ; log 
P
t
0
! , t ! .
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expectations appearing in the pricing equation (23) are given by
EPt

elog 
P
e
2
P =2

 bPt (26)
with bPt denoting the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of stock
price growth given by
bPt  1t+ 0
tX
j=1
Pj
Pj 1
+
0
t+ 0
P0
Note that the OLS estimator incorporates the prior P0 by treating it like
0 observations of stock price growth in the data. Similar approximations
for dividend expectations yield
EPt

elog 
D
e
2
D=2

 bDt  1t+ 0
tX
i=0
Di
Di 1
+
0
t+ 0
D0
so that the pricing equation (23) implies - up to a rst order approxi-
mation of conditional expectations - that
Pt =  bPt Pt +  bDt Dt (27)
or, equivalently
Pt =
bDt
1  bPt Dt (28)
This is the equation studied by Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2009). This
equation clearly says that learning about price growth behavior inu-
ences equilibrium stock prices in a model with internally rational agents
who hold a complete and consistent set of probability beliefs. Speci-
cally, it is clear that higher expected price growth bPt implies a higher
price-dividend ratio and this is what generates the price dynamics stud-
ied in that paper.17
17Equation (28) reveals that existence of an equilibrium price requires that the
(approximate) posterior mean for expected price growth bPt remains below  1. In
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2009) this condition is insured by imposing an ad-hoc
continuous projection facility on beliefs, which bounded mean price growth expecta-
tions below  1. We conjecture that this can be obtained from a consistent system
of beliefs P by truncating the upper tail of the prior density f for the unknown pa-
rameter log P . Also, since the equilibrium price Pt a¤ects the left and right hand
side of equation (28) there may actually exist multiple or no mutually consistent
equilibrium price and belief pairs. To avoid this, the estimate bPt in Adam, Marcet
and Nicolini (2009) is computed using prices up to period t   1 only. Adam and
Marcet (2010) provide an information structure where such delayed updating arises
from fully Bayesian updating behavior in a setting where agents nevertheless observe
contemporaneous prices and dividends.
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6 Sensitivity of Bayesian REE Asset Prices
This section demonstrates that the asset price in a Bayesian REE is
extremely sensitive to ne details in the specication of agentsprior be-
liefs about dividend growth. Indeed, details of agentsprior beliefs about
dividend growth matter much more for asset prices than the microeco-
nomic structure of the economy. Since economists will probably never
nd out about details on the prior, this represents a degree of freedom
in Bayesian REE modeling that strongly inuences the Bayesian REE
asset price.
For simplicity, we consider again a homogeneous agent model in
which all agents hold the same discount factor and dividend beliefs and
where this is common knowledge. Each internally rational agent can
then deduce the Bayesian REE asset price associated with any history
of dividends. This price is given by
Pt = E
P
 
lim
T!1
TX
j=1
jDt+j
Dt
!
(29)
but turns out to be extremely sensitive with respect to the prior beliefs
about the dividend process incorporated in P. Specically, as we show
in proposition 2 below, the equilibrium price can be increased by any
desired amount by simply reallocating an arbitrarily small amount of
prior probability mass.
To illustrate this point we rewrite the dividend process as
Dt = aDt 1t (30)
where t > 0 is i.i.d. with E [t] = 1 and a > 0.
18 Agentsprior density
about a is denoted by f and satises f(~a) = 0 for all ~a  0. The posterior
density about a conditional on any observed history Dt is denoted by
Postt.
The following proposition provides a rst result. It shows that unless
the posterior beliefs about dividend growth are bounded by the inverse
of the discount factor, equilibrium prices are innite. The proof of the
proposition can be found in appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 Consider the Bayesian REE asset price (29). For any
t and Dt :
1. If Postt(a   1) > 0, then
Pt =1
18The parameter a in the equation above is not exactly equal to the one employed
in equation (17), but this is of no importance for the results that follow.
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2. Let B denote the upper bound of the support of Postt. If B < 
 1
then
Pt = Dt EPostt

a
1  a

<1 (31)
The previous proposition is closely related to results derived in Pe-
saran, Pettenuzzo and Timmermann (2007), but also di¤ers because it
does not rely on parametric forms for the prior beliefs.19 This will prove
useful below for showing that the sensitivity of prices to priors is a gen-
eral phenomenon.
Proposition 1 above shows that the asset price is nite whenever the
support of the posterior density is bounded below  1. This can be
insured, for example, by choosing prior beliefs f with an upper bound
of the support B <  1. The posterior beliefs will then inherit this
property. This in turn might suggest that Bayesian REE asset prices
can not be arbitrarily high provided one imposes an upper bound B <
 1 on the support of prior dividend growth beliefs. Yet, the following
proposition shows that this fails to be true:
Proposition 2 Consider a prior density f with upper bound B <  1
for its support. There exists a sequence of densities

fk
	
with upper
bound Bk <  1 and
R fk   f  ! 0 such that the Bayesian REE price
implied by fk converges to innity as k !1.
Bounding the prior support is thus not a very robust solution to the
problem for the high sensitivity of Bayesian REE asset prices: given
any prior that implies bounded prices, there exists another prior that
is arbitrarily close to it and that gives rise to prices that are arbitrarily
large.
Due to a (well-acknowledged) shortcut this sensitivity of Bayesian
REE asset prices sometimes failed to show up in some of the Bayesian
REE literature. Timmermann (1993, 1996), for example, ignores the
posterior uncertainty about a and uses instead only the posterior mean
for a to evaluate the discounted sum in equation (29) to set
Pt = Dt
 EPostt(a)
1   EPostt(a)
where
EPostt(a) =
Z 1
0
eaPostt(ea)dea
19The result in proposition 1 also di¤ers from the examples in Geweke (2001) and
Weitzman (2007) where non-existence of expected utility does not arise from a di-
verging innite discounted sum. Instead, in these papers one-period-ahead expected
consumption utility already fails to be nite.
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so that only the posterior mean matters for equilibrium prices. As should
be clear from the results in this section, this shortcut can strongly alter
the asset pricing implications.20
7 Relation to the Literature
The concept of an Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium (IREE)
developed in this paper is a generalization of the Bayesian REE con-
cept. The latter emerges as a special case of IREE when agents pos-
sess su¢ cient knowledge about the market so that they can deduce the
equilibrium market outcome associated with any possible sequence of
fundamentals.
The IREE is also related to the private information REE analyzed
in Allen, Morris and Shin (2006). Both equilibrium concepts relax the
common knowledge assumptions of standard models, in the case of Allen,
Morris and Shin due to the assumption of private information, in our
case due to the assumption of imperfect market knowledge. Also, it
appears relatively straightforward to extend the IREE presented in the
present paper so as to incorporate private information. This extension
would cause private information REE to be a special case of private
information IREE.
The relationship between IREE and Arrow-Debreu equilibrium has
been discussed in section 3.4 before. The absence of Arrow securities
in our model appears to be an important ingredient giving rise to the
possibility that IREE outcomes can di¤er from the Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium outcomes. It seems worthwhile investigating this issue in greater
detail in future research.
Our work is also related to a number of papers in the learning liter-
ature that attempt to construct a full set of beliefs over long-horizons,
see important work by Preston (2005) and Eusepi and Preston (2008).
The main di¤erence is that our agentsbeliefs take the form of a well
dened probability measure over a stochastic process while these papers
use the anticipated utility framework of Kreps (1998). As a consequence,
agents in these models construct each period a new probability measure,
but one that is almost surely inconsistent with the measure held in the
previous period.
The setup in this paper is also indirectly related to the literature
on rational beliefs initiated by Mordecai Kurz (1997). In rational be-
liefs models agentsprobability densities are assumed to be shifting in
response to the realization of an extrinsic generating sequence. In our
20Similarly, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) assume a nite asset price after some xed
terminal date T <1. Sensitivity then arises with respect to the chosen date T .
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model belief revisions are triggered by model intrinsic factors, i.e., mar-
ket outcomes and fundamentals. Moreover, in rational belief models,
agents entertain a standard probability space over fundamentals. Thus,
unlike in the present setup agents joint beliefs about prices and dividends
incorporates a singularity.
The IREE is also related to the model-consistent equilibrium concept
of Anderson and Sonnenschein (1985) who assume that agents have a
parameterized econometric model that denes a probability density over
prices. Anderson and Sonnenschein, however, impose a kind of rational
expectations structure on the beliefs of agents: within the class of models
considered, agents are assumed to employ the parameter values that best
t the actual outcome of the data. Thus, unlike in our setting there is
no learning from market outcomes because agents are assumed to know
the best tting model from the start.
8 Conclusions
We show how one can formulate a model with internally rational agents
that fail to be externally rational because they possess only limited
knowledge about the market. Lack of market knowledge naturally gives
rise to departures from the singularity in beliefs imposed under the ra-
tional expectations assumption and allows to model learning from mar-
ket outcomes while maintaining rational decision making by agents. It
requires to enlarge the probability space underlying agentscontingent
choices and beliefs so that it contains the history of fundamentals and
market outcomes.
The equilibrium implications deriving from such a model can be rad-
ically di¤erent. In our simple asset pricing model, expectations regard-
ing the future market price become an important determinant of cur-
rent market prices, independently from agentsexpectations about fu-
ture dividends. Since market outcomes feed back into agents beliefs,
learning from market outcomes can give rise to additional propagation
in economic models.
The present paper also shows - perhaps surprisingly - that some of
the modeling choices in the adaptive learning literature are less ad-hoc
than might initially appear. This raises questions regarding the gener-
ality of these ndings. Within the asset pricing context Adam, Marcet
and Nicolini (2009) show that with risk-averse agents a similar one-step
ahead pricing equation emerges in which the evolution of agentscondi-
tional expectations can be described by least squares learning equations,
provided stock market wealth is a negligible part of agentstotal wealth.
Adam and Marcet (2010) explore the case with risk aversion in the more
appealing case where the stock market represents an important part of
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agentswealth. The consumer is then forced to take into account future
prices in a more sophisticated way than in the current setup because
future prices a¤ect future consumption abilities and because the agent
dislikes consumption volatility. Equilibrium prices then depend on the
agentsbeliefs about all future prices and future dividends jointly. This
shows how the microfoundations of the model are informative about
what beliefs matter for the equilibrium outcomes.
By allowing for subjective beliefs that are not equal to the objective
beliefs, the present approach introduces a degree of freedom for the eco-
nomic modeler. We impose some discipline on subjective belief choice
by considering only small deviations from RE priors, as discussed in sec-
tion 5.2, but clearly this falls short of specifying the specic direction
that these small deviations should take. For example, one could consider
more general laws of motion for prices, say ones that also incorporate
dividend growth on the right side of equation (19).21 Alternatively, one
could consider more restrictive laws of motion, e.g., ones that impose
the additional restriction that prices and dividends are cointegrated in
equation (19). These alternative subjective belief specications give rise
to potentially di¤erent model behavior and should be studied in further
research.
While it is true that economists with too many degrees of freedom can
produce absurd results, additional degrees of freedom could also be used
judiciously and in a productive way, as has occurred in other parts of
the economics literature. Over time, the quantitative business cycle lit-
erature, for example, has learnt how to specify utility functions, relevant
frictions, or market equilibrium concepts in a way that captures agents
actual behavior and interactions. It is our rm belief that economists
can also learn to judiciously deal with the additional degree of freedom
introduced within the current paper. If reasonably specied small de-
partures from the RE priors move the model predictions strongly in the
direction of the data, then it would certainly be worthwhile to seriously
explore such departures as potential explanations of the data. Indeed,
to the extent that the profession seeks to understand the forces shaping
market outcomes, it would make little sense to declare such departures
tabu.
Summing up, we believe that internal rationality is an interesting
approach to model behavior in models of learning. It provides guidance
about what models of learning are fully consistent with optimizing be-
havior and, in doing so, it provides a rationale for asset pricing equations
with very di¤erent implications than those emerging from the standard
21As long as the prior on the parameter multiplying dividend growth has large
mass near zero, this still constitutes a smalldeviation from RE priors.
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REE approach. We expect the concept of internal rationality to have
a wide range of fruitful applications in many eld of economics dealing
with dynamic decision making.
A Appendix
A.1 Existence of a Maximum
Strictly speaking the rst order conditions (8) can only be used if exis-
tence of a maximum is guaranteed. With arbitrary price beliefs and risk
neutrality an agent may assign positive probability to prices growing at
a rate larger than the inverse of the discount factor, allowing the con-
sumer to achieve arbitrary high levels of utility so a maximum might fail
to exist.
This appendix shows that with slightly modied utility functions a
maximum always exists for the investors maximization problem and how
the analysis in the main text applies to this modied setup. Consider
the following alternative family of utility functions that is indexed by C
UC(C
i
t) =

Cit C
i
t  C
C + g(Cit   C) Cit > C
where g is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, di¤erentiable and bounded
function satisfying g(0) = 0, g0(0) = 1 and g ()  g. Marginal utility of
consumption is equal to one for consumption levels below C but lower for
higher consumption levels. For C ! 1 this utility function converges
pointwise to the linear utility function in the main text.
For a given history ! = (P0; D0; P1; D1; :::) the utility generated by
some contingent stock holding plan S = fS0; S1; :::g with St : 
t !
[0; S] is
V (S; !) =
1X
t=0
tUC(St 1(!
t) (Pt +Dt) +    St(!t)Pt)
Since
V (S; !)  C + g
1   for all S and all ! 2 

and since P assigns zero probability to negative values of P and D, this
implies that expected utility is bounded. Since the action space S is
compact, an expected utility maximizing plan does exist.
Next, we show that for any nite number of periods T < 1, the
rst order conditions with this bounded utility function are given - with
probability arbitrarily close to one - by a set of rst order conditions that
approximate the ones used in the main text with arbitrary precision. The
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probability converges to one and the approximation error disappears as
C !1:
The optimum with bounded utility functions is characterized by the
rst order conditions
U 0
C
(Cit)Pt < 
iEP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

and Sit = S
U 0
C
(Cit)Pt = 
iEP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

and Sit 2

0; S

U 0
C
(Cit)Pt > 
iEP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

and Sit = 0
In any period t, the agents actual consumption Cit in EQUILIBRIUM
is bounded by the available dividends Dt. Thus, for any T < 1 the
probability that

Dt  C
	T
t=0
in equilibrium can be brought arbitrarily
close to one by choosing C su¢ ciently high. Therefore, with arbitrarily
high probability the agents rst order conditions in t = 1; :::; T are given
by
Pt < 
iEP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

and Sit = S (32)
Pt = 
iEP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

and Sit 2

0; S

(33)
Pt > 
iEP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

and Sit = 0 (34)
Since agentsbeliefs satisfy (7) and assign zero probability to negative
dividends and prices, we have from Lebegues Dominated Convergence
Theorem
lim
C!1
EP
i
t

U 0
C
(Cit+1) (Pt+1 +Dt+1)

= EP
i
t [(Pt+1 +Dt+1)] (35)
This implies that for C !1 the rst order conditions (32)-(34) approx-
imate with arbitrary precision the rst order conditions (8) used in the
main text.
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A.2 Approximation of Beliefs
This appendix derives the approximation in equation (26). Letting 
denote an equality that is correct up to rst order we have:
EPt

elog 
P
elog "
P
t+1

EPt
 
1 + log P + log "Pt+1

=1 + log Pt
=1 +
1
t+ 0
tX
j=1
log
Pj
Pj 1
+
0
t+ 0
ln P0
 1 + 1
t+ 0
tX
j=1

Pj
Pj 1
  1

+
0
t+ 0
 
P0   1

=
1
t+ 0
tX
j=1
Pj
Pj 1
+
0
t+ 0
P0
= bPt (36)
where the linear approximation in the rst line has been taken with re-
spect to log P and log "Pt+1 around the point log 
P = log "Pt+1 = 0; the
second line uses the fact that EPt log "
P
t+1 = 0 and that the posterior
beliefs imply that EPt

log P

= log Pt ;
22 the third line uses the update
rule (25a) to derive an alternative expression for log Pt ; the linear ap-
proximation in the forth line is taken with respect to Pj=Pj 1 and 
P
0
around the point Pj=Pj 1 = 1 and log 
P = 0.
A.3 Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1:. Fix t and Dt. For any realization !D 2 
D
for which the rst t elements are given by Dt, the law of motion for
dividends for all j  1 implies
Dt+j(!D) = a(!D)
j
jY
=1
t+ (!D) Dt
so that the partial discounted sum can be expressed as
TX
j=1
j Dt+j(!D) =
TX
j=1
ja(!D)
j
TY
=1
t+ (!D) Dt (37)
22This follows from the fact that the marginal posterior for price and dividend
growth is Student t-distributed with nt   1 degrees of freedom, location vector
log Pt ; log 
D
t
0
and precision matrix vt (nt   1)St, see chapter 9.11 in DeGroot
(1970).
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To prove the rst part of the proposition notice
EP
 
lim
T!1
TX
j=1
j Dt+j(!D)
Dt
!
 EP
 
TX
j=1
j Dt+j(!D)
Dt
!
= EP
 
TX
j=1
ja(!D)
j
jY
=1
t+ (!D) Dt
Dt
!
= Dt
Z 1
0
 
TX
j=1
j (ea)j! Postt(ea) dea
(38)
 Dt
Z 1
 1
 
TX
j=1
j (ea)j! Postt(ea) dea  Dt  T  Z 1
 1
Postt(ea) dea =1
(39)
where the rst inequality uses the fact Dt  0, the rst equality the
expression (37), the next equality the independence of future s from
Dt and a; the next inequality uses the fact that dividends are positive and
the second the fact that ea  1 over the considered range of integration.
The last equality uses that since part of the support is higher than  1
implies
R1
 1 Postt(ea)dea > 0.
To prove the second part of the proposition, given t; dene the func-
tion
F(!D) =
1X
j=1
jBj
jY
=1
t+ (!D) Dt
By standard arguments, the innite sum on the right side exists almost
surely and is nite. Therefore, F is well dened for almost all !D and
is integrable:
EP
 F(!D)jDt = B
1  BDt <1
Moreover, for all T and for given Dt
TX
j=1
j Dt+j(!D)  F(!D) a:s:
Therefore, the partial sums (37) are bounded a.s. by the integrable
function F , so that we can apply Lebesgues dominated convergence
theorem to obtain the rst equality below:
EP
 
lim
T!1
TX
j=1
jDt+j
Dt
!
= lim
T!1
EP
 
TX
j=1
j Dt+j
Dt
!
= Dt
Z 1
0
 
lim
T!1
TX
j=1
j (ea)j!Postt(ea) dea = DtEPostt  a1  a

32
The second equality follows from using (37) and taking expectations as
when deriving (38). This proves the second part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2:. The proof is by construction. Let us rst
prove that P0 ! 1 for a sequence of priors when k ! 1: Given any
prior f with upper bound for the support B <  1 we can construct an
alternative sequence of priors
fk(a) =

(1  Bk B
k
)f(a) for a 2 [0; B]
1
k
for a 2]B;Bk]
where
Bk = maxfB;  1(1  1
k
)g
The density fk distributes probability mass 1
k
uniformly on the interval
]B;Bk]; here Bk is the upper bound for the support of fk and we have
limk!1Bk = 
 1. As required this sequence of alternative priors satisesR fk   f ! 0 as k !1 becauseZ fk   f =Z B
0
Bk  Bk f
+ Z Bk
B
1
k
=2
Bk  B
k
< 2
 1  B
k
Moreover, it follows from part 1 of proposition 1 and simple derivations
that
P0 = E
Pk
0
 1X
j=1
jDj
!
= D0Efk

a
1  a

= D0
Z Bk
0
ea
1  eafk(ea) dea  D0
Z Bk
B
ea
1  eafk(ea) dea
 D0
Z Bk
B
B
1  ea 1k dea = D0Bk
Z Bk
B
1
1  ea dea
Using the change of variables x = 1  ea the integral in the last line can
be expressed asZ Bk
B
1
1  ea dea =
Z 1 B
1 Bk
1
x
dx =
1
(1  Bk)2  
1
(1  B)2
and we have
lim
k!1
B
k
Z Bk
B
1
1  ea dea = limk!1 Bk

k2   1
(1  B)2

=1
33
which establishes the claim for P0:
For Pt; all that changes is that the posterior for each fk is scaled
by the likelihood of the observed realization according to the model at
hand. As long as the likelihood puts positive weight on all parameter
values below  1 the derivations above work in the same way.
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